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The Croatian financial system has come under
consideration only very recently. However, at this moment
focus is on the commercial banking sector. That the quality
of services provided by the financial system affects the
performance of the economy as a whole, is a well-known
fact. In addition, how well the financial system ofa country
satisfies the needs of its users is a matter ofpublic concern
and democracy and is particularly important in new
democracies such as the Republic of Croatia. Efforts to
reach the standards of a market-driven economy and the
privatization process itself, make it necessary to look not
only into the commercial banking sector but into a large
number of subjects, instruments and procedures that are
emerging in the financial system. The object of any inquiry
today is to ascertain whether the organization of the
financial system and the practices of its institutions are




As a newly independent state (1991 ), Croatia does
not have much experience and expertise in setting up and
running a sovereign financial system. From its central
role of monetary authority the National Bank of Croatia
founded as an independent central bank at the end of 1991,
has beerr the engine of the development of the financial
system. The evaluation of the current financial system
should take into consideration the major economic
imbalances, mainly caused by the war and Serbian
aggression, but also by poor management of the economic
system during the Communist regime. In 1993, prompted
by extremely high inflation, which in the first ten months
of 1993, reached an average 28% per month, the Croatian
Government launched a stabilization programme in
October 1993, whose primary objective was to bring
inflation down to an acceptable level. In the next steps of
the programme, the government will deal with a whole
variety of problems starting with structural changes in
the economy to measures aimed at creating an economy
ready to fully accept the norms of a market economy and
enter a period of sustained economic growth. The situation
has not been very helpful for the programme. With
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estimated war damage at about 15 billion US$, a steep
decline in the GDP, high unemployment and real wages
more than halved, these represent a very unfriendly ground
for building up a modern financial system.
A banking sector legacy
The analysis of the asset side of the banking sector
shows a relatively good performance of the assets
management function. However, an independent analysis
could come to quite a different conclusion. Some serious
. doubts could be expressed in banks rating or risk
classification of loans given. Inside that category one
should be careful when assessing emerging securities risks
and less liquid capital markets, as in Croatia (is), fairly
higher than in fully functioning markets' and therefore
require a higher risk premium. Consequently, special
reserves for potential losses should be higher in the whole
sector. The fact that long-term financing of the banking
sector amounts to 61.2% of the assets gives rise to concern.
What is more worrying is that more than 50% of it has
been invested in long-term securities at the moment when
the market in Croatia is illiquid, with default risk in all
cases fairly high. Furthermore, a large part was placed in
equities of various companies. This vast amount of
banking sector assets, practically immobilized and non-
performing alongside with various other frozen funds,
amount to 75.2% of the overall assets. The big four banks
amount to 2/3 of the sectorial balance sheet, which shows
strong banking concentration. Very early on, the Croatian
government recognized the danger of major crisis in the
financial sector and launched a programme in order to
rehabilitate the financial sector through a case-by-case
approach. This will put additional pressure on an already
overworked state. The expected help from the EBRD and
the World Bank is therefore badly needed. The
underdeveloped financial sector and poor performance of
the supply side compound the problem. As a legacy,
savings in financial assets have almost become a forgotten
category, with the bulk of savings kept under matrasses
or abroad. Official data, however, show the ratio of savings
at deposits with banks to GDP of about 17%. Most of the
savings are in foreign currencies (almost 84% of total
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savings). Critics have been pointing their finger at poor
assets management of bank savings, which is partly
responsible for the supply problem affecting the prevailing
high interest rates. In the following text we shall try to
discuss the efficiency of the Croatian financial system and
to point out what should be done in order to benefit from
a fully functioning system.
Putting aside the facilitation of payment within the
economy, we shall concentrate on the function of the
financial system to raise saving and investment levels and
the provision of incentives for the allocation of the
available resources to those uses where they are likely to
give the highest returns.
One of the factors that influences saving and
investments is the psychological element, whose roots go
back to the former Communist regime. Confidence in the
banking sector has been even more undermined after
independence. The reason is the fact the Central Bank of
ex- Yugoslavia still controls a big chunk of the foreign
currency reserves which belong to all the former member
states. This has created a problem for Croatian banks,
which have been unable to service withdrawals from
individual foreign currency deposits kept inside them.
Such deposits are now called "frozen-foreign currency"
and are being used as a means of payment for the
privatization of state assets. The past experience of high
inflation and from time to time, hyper-inflation, still
influences saving. On the micro-economic level, the
availability of financial instruments is far from
satisfactory. At the moment, potential investors are offered
two instruments, with nothing between them in terms of
risk, shares from privatization, and bank deposits, as a
basic banking function.
The allocational efficiency of the financial market
sill struggles with the remnants of the past. The moment
to stop opportune state interference in allocation was not
used. A very doubtful mechanism of pricing in
privatization did not emerge from the usual market
elements of pricing thus creating a problem that will be
augmented in the next privatization stage. The issue of
competition that helps and encourages elasticity and
choice should be dealt with, taking into consideration the
strong forces that do not allow its functioning.
Nevertheless, competition is functioning only in small
segments of the financial system, and class not have the
usual effect natural to transparent financial markets.
Savings in the form of life insurance, private pension
plans, investment in securities that would meet the needs
of individual savers, are things for all of us to work on.
On the other hand, borrowers not only can not obtain short-
term bank financing, irrelevant of risk involved in lending;
they know that to raise long-term finance from the bank
is impossible. Banks are not able to finance long-term
needs, for, as they point out, they are short of long-term
funds. As is quite often the case with transitional
economies, securities markets and securitisation itself, as
an alternative financing mechanism, are still in the
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embryonic stage of development. Low financial system
elasticity comes from sectorial lending (un)preferences
of Croatian banks and partly form unsuitable financial
instruments. In spite of their unwillingness to engage in
long-term lending, banks are now obtaining substantial
equity stakes which they hold in their (un)structured
portfolios.
One of the aspects dealing with efficiency, states
that the financial system should ensure prices, or interest
rates, of securities to be equal after allowing for differences
in risk and cost of transactions. The first difficulty here is
that risk has not been fully recognized as a market category
and that the general public first faced and equity risk
category inside privatization - which is a rather unnatural
way of being introduced to risk. A tight monetary pol icy
alongside with an inadequate regulation of bankruptcy
have created a parallel money market with big
discrepancies in interest rates. It appears that high interest
rates are to be attributed to several factors. As we already
pointed out, the supply side ofthe system is by far weaker
than demand for funds. The next reason lies in the state
of affairs inside bank balance sheets as well as in
administrative directives influencing foreign currency
deposit management. Interest rates differ between the
official and banking markets: the parallel market ranges,
due to the aforementioned problems, from the average
22% per year to 7-10% a month. At this moment it is
difficult to identify even the"bench-mark" interest rate.
Obviously, high interest rates are the main obstacle for
further development. On the security side of the financial
system the way in which privatization was and still is
conducted and particularly the method of pricing state
assets, have totally distorted the prices of securities. The
absence of market information with the exception of the
information provided by the Zagreb Stock Exchange with
virtually no corporate information, make an evaluation
of the information impact on the prices of securities
impossible for the moment.
In addition, economic controls performed by the
government are not in accordance with competitive
neutrality and are partly influencing the general level of
interest rates. When it comes to taxes and subsidies, they
are of minor importance at this moment. However, it is
quite possible for the government to start introducing
various investment tax incentives in the near future.
Instead of a conclusion
In our effort to identify the problems in the
financial system, we have been tolerant because of the
transitional problems of the Croatian economy. Judging
the financial system quality, in the Cro.ltian case a just
excuse for the absence of necessary action can be found.
At a time of war and aggression against it, Croatia is
definitely not in a good position to start building the
financial system from scratch. However, the indications
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of non-market practices and irrationality given here are
things that should be dealt with first. The biggest part of
distortions mentioned have their roots in the former
communist regime. A general lack of confidence and
Serbian aggression still playa role. A better promotion of
the financial services and investment tax incentives would
probably have some limited success in efforts to help
savings and investment. Market stability criteria show a
big discrepancy between short- and long-term availability
offunds, in favour of the former. The amplitude of current
interest rates fluctuations points to a continuous interest
rates increase, particularly in the parallel market - which
poi nts towards an inappropriate functioning of the
financial system. Problems on the supply side should be
fought in parallel with banking sector rehabilitation and
the raising of the level of savings. Action should by no
means be concentrated on the banking sector alone. The
privatization process is paving the way for fully
functioning and transparent. capital markets. The Croatian
government saw this necessity and has already started
implementation of a three-year project that will
considerably enhance the level of capital markets. In our
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opinion, considering the big capital needs of a transitional
economy, all actions should be accompanied by strong
encouragement of foreign capital inflows. Signs of state
interference in capital allocation persist in a generally
unstable economic system. Due to the legacy from the
past, the system of regulated interest rates and limitation
of credit, the limited amount of credit is directed largely
to politically popular companies, mostly big employers.
In order to raise efficiency, the bank management should
be given more independence and authority to effectively
manage banks once they are rehabilitated. On the other
hand, management should work harder on acquiring
greater expertise and knowledge. Inflationary risk has for
some time been fought eagerly by pegging-up or indexing
the value oflocal currency to the German Mark. However,
indexation has spread to ~I sectors of the economy and is
there to stay, thus showing the general belief in the local
currency and danger of inflationary expectations. The
letter can be dealt with successfully only through a sound
economic policy of sustained growth and an efficient
financial system. •
